

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X 1		
2	DDCI		X 3		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X 4		
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9	Chm/NIC		X 5		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS/DI		X 6		
18	NIO/CBW		X 7		
19	D/SOVA/DI		X 8		
20	<i>ER</i>		X 2		
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks

*AH* Executive Secretary  
3 NOV 86  
Date

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTONExempt from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
86-4896x/1

October 30, 1986

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Dear Cap:

As you point out in your memorandum of October 13, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in November 1985 to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. We have met with the Soviets on two occasions to carry out this agreement and I believe we are making reasonable progress toward our goal.

During the most recent meeting, in September, the US delegation was instructed "to explore whether the USSR is willing to take concrete steps to stem the further use and dangerous spread of chemical weapons" (copy of guidance attached). Further, in implementing its instruction "to work to develop an informal common approach on the problem of CW proliferation and means for dealing with it" in order to report to their Ministers, the delegation identified areas of possible agreement with the Soviets and also noted other areas where common ground does not exist. It is clear to me that the delegation executed these instructions faithfully and with the creativity necessary to elicit an honest Soviet appraisal of what steps they might be able to take in this area.

Moreover, I am satisfied that the delegation fully carried out its instructions to emphasize that the Soviet Union's violations of existing agreements had contributed to the deterioration of the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. This unacceptable Soviet conduct was emphasized in the March round of meetings and repeated in September in the context of finding common ground on preventing chemical weapons proliferation, which was the focus of the talks.

I view these talks with the Soviets as an opportunity to engage and pressure them to take concrete steps, as we have, to curb the proliferation of chemical weapons. Our discussions with them to date have concentrated on producing a common understanding of the problem. I do not believe that such discussions accord the Soviets "respectability" on the CW issue. Instead, we have and will continue to make clear that we expect the Soviets to take actions in this area, actions which can improve Western security by inhibiting other nations' chemical weapons programs that are not in our interests.

The Honorable  
Casper Weinberger,  
Secretary of Defense.

DCI  
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We will continue to consult closely with your staff to ensure that our conduct of these talks is fully consistent with our national security interests and with approved guidelines.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

Enclosure:

As stated

cc: Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs ✓

Director of Central Intelligence

Director, US Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000

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GENEVA FOR CD DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, UR, US  
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR SECOND ROUND OF US-  
SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON CW NON-PROLIFERATION

REFS: (A) STATE 197589;  
----- (B) MOSCOW 10919;  
----- (C) GENEVA 06582;  
----- (D) STATE 064082;  
----- (E) BERN 01306

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN BERN ON SEPTEMBER 4-5 FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF BILATERAL TALKS ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR U.S. REPS TO THE MEETING.

3. GUIDANCE:

(A) GENERAL

-- THE U.S. GIVES TOP PRIORITY TO MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION OF A WORLD-WIDE COMPREHENSIVE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON CW. INTERIM STEPS TO CURB THE SPREAD AND USE OF CW COULD BE A USEFUL COMPLEMENT TOWARD THIS GOAL, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DIVERT ENERGY FROM EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE BAN.

(B) REASONS FOR CONCERN.

-- U.S. REPS SHOULD STRESS THE MOST DANGEROUS CASES OF USE AND TRANSFER OF CHEMICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS AS KEY ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE NEED TO CURB THE DANGEROUS SPREAD OF THESE WEAPONS.

-- REPS SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S VIOLATIONS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND BLOCKING OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CASES OF ALLEGED USE

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USDP:DSAA(4) DD(1) ED(1) DI-5(1) NMIC(1) DI-5B(1)  
JSI-5(1) DC-1A(1) AT-2(2) AT-4(1) DIO(1) VP FRD(1)  
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+USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
+USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE  
+DNA WASHINGTON DC//OACP/STMA//  
+CNC CC WASHINGTON DC  
+CDR 4TH PYSOP GROUP FT BRAGG NC  
+FTD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//SIIR//  
+USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
+SAFE

HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORM AGAINST USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BOTH DIRECTLY AND AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHERS.

(C) REPORT TO FOREIGN MINISTERS.

-- AT THE FIRST BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON PROLIFERATION, SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. VIEW THAT BOTH SIDES COULD WORK TO DEVELOP AN INFORMAL COMMON APPROACH ON THE PROBLEM OF CW PROLIFERATION AND MEANS FOR DEALING WITH IT. DEL SHOULD LAY OUT U.S. VIEWS, WITH OBJECTIVE THAT SIDES WOULD REPORT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

(C) EXPORT CONTROLS.

-- THIS YEAR THE USSR ANNOUNCED BROAD, WORLDWIDE CONTROL OF NINE CHEMICALS AND ONE GROUP OF CHEMICALS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR CW PRODUCTION. US REPS SHOULD SEEK TO GAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THESE EXPORT CONTROLS WORK AND HOW EFFECTIVE THEY ARE, INCLUDING UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE USSR HAS APPLIED THEM. IN ADDITION, DGI SHOULD SEEK INFORMATION ON SOVIET EXPORTS TO IRAN, IRAQ AND SYRIA OF THE CHEMICALS CONTROLLED, INCLUDING QUANTITY AND DESTINATION.

--U.S. REPS SHOULD URGE SOVIETS TO ADJUST THEIR CONTROLS TO MAKE THEM MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE AUSTRALIAN GROUP CORE LIST OF FIVE CHEMICALS, WHICH THE U.S. IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING FOR WORLD-WIDE CONTROL, THE FOUR OTHER CHEMICALS THE U.S. CONTROLS ON A DESTINATION-SPECIFIC BASIS, AND THE EIGHT OTHER CHEMICALS NOW BEING CONSIDERED FOR CONTROL BY THE AUSTRALIAN GROUP. U.S. REPS SHOULD RESIST SOVIET PRESSURE TO MATCH THEIR LIST OF CONTROLLED ITEMS SINCE THAT LIST IS NOT BASED UPON ACTIVE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS BY THOSE COUNTRIES SEEKING TO ACQUIRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- AT THE LAST U.S.-USSR DISCUSSIONS OF CW PROLIFERATION, THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED THEY HAVE DISCUSSED THEIR EXPORT CONTROLS WITH THEIR ALLIES. US REPS SHOULD QUERY THE SOVIETS AS TO SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS AND THE NATURE OF NSWP COUNTRIES' RESPONSES, AS WELL AS PRESS THE SOVIETS TO URGE THEIR ALLIES TO IMPOSE SUCH CONTROLS.

-- URGE SOVIETS TO INCLUDE CW NONPROLIFERATION AS ONE OF ITS GOALS IN ITS DEALINGS WITH FRIENDLY THIRD PARTIES (THAT WOULD INCLUDE, E.G., SYRIA, BUT WE WOULD MAKE NO EFFORT TO HAVE SPECIFIC COUNTRIES NAMED.)

(D) SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, US UNGA RESOLUTION.

-- WHEN APPROPRIATE, US REPS SHOULD RAISE APPARENT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE MARCH 21 PRESIDENT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT CONFIRMING IRAQI CW USE. NOTE STATED OPPOSITION TO THE SPREAD OF CW IN THE AREA REFERRED TO IN THE MURPHY-POLYCKOV MEETING, AND EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SOVIETS ENCOURAGING THE IRAQIS TO CEASE CW USE, AS WE HAVE URGED THEM TO DO.

-- US REPS SHOULD ASK THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT THE U.S. RESOLUTION ON CW USE AND PROLIFERATION AT 41ST UNGA.

-- SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT UN INVESTIGATIONS OF CW USE ANYWHERE IT MAY OCCUR. U.S. REPS SHOULD POINT OUT THAT PAST SOVIET OPPOSITION TO SUCH INVESTIGATION HAS SERIOUSLY LIMITED THE ABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PURSUE THE ALLEGATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE.

-- EXPLORE WHETHER THE USSR IS WILLING TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO STEM THE FURTHER USE AND DANGEROUS SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

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4. OTHER GUIDANCE:

(A) ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER MEETINGS: PRESUMING A BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE AT THE SEPTEMBER 4-5 SESSION, AND IF REQUESTED BY THE SOVIETS, U.S. REPS SHOULD SAY THAT THEY WILL REPORT SUCH A REQUEST BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION.

(B) AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT ON A SHORT JOINT PRESS RELEASE TO BE ISSUED AT THE END OF THIS ROUND OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. WHITEHEAD BT

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## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

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14	D/PAO				
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17	C/ACIS		X		
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*ER*

Remarks

*A/* Executive Secretary  
23 Oct 86

Date

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Executive Priority

86- 4896X

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13 OCT 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Dialogue on the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons (U)

(S) In reviewing the status of our talks with the Soviet Union on the proliferation of chemical weapons, I note that our delegation has gone well-beyond what I understand to be the policy on this subject. As CW proliferation was made a subject of the 1985 meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, and as we are preparing for a second meeting, I fear that important defense policies will be at risk if we continue down our current path.

(S) I expressed my views to John Poindexter (copies to you and Ken Adelman) in a memorandum on 20 December 1985 (Tab A). Though my suggested guidelines were not adopted in full as recommended, neither to my knowledge were any others. In the CBW Interagency Group my staff has adhered to my views and has been reasonably satisfied that agreed instructions to the US Delegation protected DoD's interests. I was surprised, therefore, to read the report of a US-Soviet meeting that took place on 4-5 September 1986 (message from AMEMBASSY Bern, 05694, Secret NODIS). A number of points in the report, including those noted below, either contradict the IG approved guidance for the meeting or reflect ideas that I am told were discussed and rejected by the IG (instructions message at Tab B).

(S) Among the US-proposed "agreed points" is the proposition that "measures must be taken" against the spread of chemical weapons and that parties should affirm the objective of preventing "the transfer of chemical weapons or the materials, equipment or technology destined for their manufacture." As you know, I do not believe this nation should renounce the possibility of providing a chemical retaliatory capability to an ally in some future contingency. Indeed, current US military planning provides for the transfer of CW to allies in wartime under the following conditions: CW has been used against us or our allies; the ally requests transfer; the President approves the request. In some circumstances, largely due to the nature of coalition warfare, for us to limit ourselves in advance to a US-only CW response would limit or negate our ability to maintain deterrence or to cause an enemy to terminate its use of CW.

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(S) Another undesirable aspect of the recent talks is that we are granting the USSR respectability in a field where they deserve none. The Soviets were not, apparently, pressed hard at Bern about their past transfer of CW to their surrogates in Southeast Asia or their own use of CW in Afghanistan. Instead we treat them, and allow them to posture publicly, as if they are responsible, law-abiding actors in this field.

(S) Finally, the two sides agreed to recommend high level statements concerning these "points" and to hold future meetings at regular intervals. Both steps simply reinforce the invalid notion that there is a fertile field for US-Soviet cooperation in the area of CW proliferation (and, incidentally, exceed agreed instructions).

(S) The foregoing are some of the issues to which we take the strongest exception. I do not believe it is in our national interest to go down this road. It is essential that we reject certain of the policies put forward at Bern, and that no public statements be made. I hope as well that we can return to proper use of the interagency policy-making process in this field so vital to national defense.

Attachment  
a/s



cc: Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Director of Central Intelligence

Director, US Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

20 DEC 1965

*John*  
MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Dialogue on CW Nonproliferation (U)

(S) The Administration's work on fleshing out the chemical weapons (CW) "non-proliferation" language in the summit joint statement requires additional guidance if we are to avoid certain major pitfalls. Interagency discussions have revealed divergent views as to the purpose, nature and substance of the envisioned talks.

(S) The benefit of a CW "non-proliferation" discussion with the Soviets is primarily the opportunity it affords us (1) to elaborate directly to them on the military, legal, and humanitarian perils that result from the deterioration of post-World War I norms against the use of CW in war, a deterioration attributable chiefly to Soviet violations of existing chemical and biological weapon treaties; and (2) to demonstrate to the American public, Congress, and our allies that we are concerned about the problem and willing to broach it directly with the Soviets.

(S) The pitfalls include: (1) the danger of giving the Soviets respectability in the CW field, where they now deservedly have none; (2) the opportunity for the Soviets to use the talks to define as "proliferation" both the U.S. binary modernization program and existing and potential deployments of U.S. chemical munitions in Europe or elsewhere.

(U) I recommend that the USG use the following guidelines as we proceed with this initiative:

- Eschew general or blanket condemnations of CW "proliferation;" employ instead statements opposing "any spread of CW that increases the danger of chemical warfare." Should the UK, for example, decide (as it has lately considered doing) to develop a CW retaliatory capability to enhance NATO's deterrent, we would not want that defined as "proliferation." Also, the term "proliferation" implies parallels to the nuclear non-proliferation area, but these are inapt because the trade and production aspects are

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not analogous, the USG is not aiming at a CW treaty like the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and the USG does not favor creating an IAEA-type organization in the CW field. Focusing instead on minimizing the danger of chemical warfare would allow us to continue to justify our European deployment (as we always have) as a measure that enhances deterrence.

- Recognize that, contrary to the situation in the nuclear non-proliferation field, the Soviets in the CW field are not our partners in reducing the dangers of proliferation; in fact, they are the major part of the problem. The talks with them might be constructive, but they will not be cooperative. We can deliver messages and perhaps affect their behavior, but there is no non-trivial common ground between us. If we speak of cooperation, we fall straight into the respectability pitfall.

- At the new talks, we could apprise the Soviets of the chemicals that we subject to CW export controls, stress our reasons for concern about the undesirable spread of CW capabilities, and air our disapproval of various instances of CW use in war in recent years, especially by the Soviets and their clients.

- We should refrain from suggesting joint efforts in the field. Rather than thus promote illusions of Soviet responsibility, we should use the talks as a vehicle for calling the attention of the American people and the allies to (1) the Soviets' use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and the transfer of such weapons to their clients in Southeast Asia, (2) the enormous offensive biological weapons program underway in the Soviet Union, and (3) the unreasonableness and intransigence of the Soviet position in the Geneva talks on a comprehensive CW ban.

- Discussing specific third-country cases (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria) with the Soviets is likely to yield no benefit and may merely open the way for attacks on US friends and US deployments abroad.

- There is no reason to institutionalize the talks. A small number of meetings (perhaps two, one in Washington, one in Moscow) should allow us to accomplish our purposes. To leave open the prospect of more meetings is practically to beg for political pressure on us to devise some kind of CW non-proliferation agreement with the Soviets, which no one in the USG now says is in our interest.

(U) It would help the CBW IG if such guidelines were endorsed by the President in an NSDD or through other means.

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control  
and Disarmament Agency